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"THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD: MASSIVE RESISTANCE AND NORFOLK, V~." 
On Hay 17, 1954, Justice Harlan's lone dissent of the 11separate-
but-equal" doctrine lnid down in the rimjority opinion of P:l;essy v. 
Ferguson (18ltG) bec~mc the lmr of the lnm1. 'T'he Supreme Court, under 
Chief Justice .E<lrl \-.'arren, unanimously :::truck dm·m "legal:iized" 
segreg<:i.~tion in public schools in Brotvn v. Bonrd of Education of Topeka. 
The landmark case sparked a nm: era of racial relations, cutting 
deeply into the fabric of Southern trndHions and prejudices. The 
Southern States, especially Virginia, had to conie·to grips with a 
seemingly ovcruhclming dilemmn-- to enf orcc the Supreme Court ruling 
or fie;ht for a Southern "tradition"-- the scc;regation of the races. 
Virginia decided to fight for ~.states' right to oversee public 
school education. Through a program of m~ssive resistance, Norfolk 
became a pawn in the struge;le to maintain segregated schools. 
Before the Brovm decision in i951f, the 11sep::i.rate-but-equal 11 
doctdne had been abolished in the aren of gre.duate and professionnl 
schooJ.s. The .'3upreme Court by 1950 had ruled unconstitutional two 
devices used by .Southern Stutes to promote segregation in the uni-
versities. In Mississippi, the case of I,loyd Gaines '"'as instrumental 
in outlawins scholarshi1)s for blacks to out-of-state schools because 
they uere not the .same, .. as furnishing- equal facilLti.os. 1 Jn Sweatt v. 
Painter (1950), the court ruled that in no vay could a three room law 
school be equal to the law school c.t the University of Texas. Further-
more, in the case of George licLawin, the court ruled if a school 
ndnitted n necro student, he was eligible for the same rights and 
pri viler,es rn otlter students. 2 Therefore, by 1950 the groundwork was 
laid for outlmd.ng segregation in the public schools. 
In 1952, the Supreme Court was asked to consider the NAACP's 
challenge of scgrer,atctl public schools. The court adjourned without 
rendering a'l'l opinion and called for rcnrgumentation in the 1953 term. 
Johm \v. Davie prc.sented the statcG' case, declnring uncler the consti-
tution that the states had a right to regulate public schools without 
federal interference, and relied heavily upon Plessy v. Ferguson as 
precedent for segrcgntion. 3 Thurgood !·br.shall, arguing the case for 
integration, stated that the writers of the fourteenth amendment's 
intent was to outlaw segregation. Also, segregation itself had a 
lt detrimental effect upon both black and white children. 
On ~fay 17, 1951f, when the ::>upreme Court lw.nded dm-rn its opinion, 
it used '.rhurgood ITarshall' s arguments on the importance of education 
as a major function of state and local government: 
" ••• Compulsory school attendence laws and the grent ex-
penditure for education both dcmonstrv.te our recognition of 
the iffportance or education to our democratic society ••••• 
it is doubtful any child may rea.sonably be expected to 
succeed in life if he is denied an opportunity, where the 
states have undertaken to provide it, is ~ right that must 
be mnde nvailablc to all on equal terms." 
After stating the "equal terms" policy, the court used it to in-
validate separate facilities because they denied Negro children 
"cqup_l educational opportunities. 11 The tribunal, using the same lines 
of reasoning, dealt uith racial aspects.of scgreeation, stating, 
11 
••• '.i'o separate them (Negroes) from others of similar age and 
qualifications soley because of their rnce generates a feeling of 
inferiority as to their statlis in the community that may affect their 
6 hearts and minds in a way tmlikely ever to be undone. 11 The inevitable 
conclusion by the court was• " ••• that in the field of public education 
the doctrine of' sepa:rate.~_but-equal' has no place ••• 117 because it 
2 
denied Negroes the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 
foui-teenth amendment. At the end of the opinion, the court asked that 
the interested parties submit briefs on the implementation of its 
ruling. 
In one clean swift blow, the Supreme Court overturned Plcssy v. 
Ferguson. Knowine; the importance of ib> ruling, the court presented 
a firm,. united stand.'against segregation by being unanimous. Also, 
the court postponed ruling on the implementation of its decision to 
11 f fl t . h . t t ff 1 . • t t. 8 a ow or re ec Jon, oping o s ave o exp osivc s1 ua ions. 
Th~.Supreme Court had acted, and it \-:as up to the states to react. 
Considering the implications of Brown, the immediate reactions 
of state leaders tended to be rather mild. For instance, Dr. Dowell 
J. Howard, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction in Virginia 
stated that 11 ••• there will be no defiance of the Supreme Court decision 
. 
as far as I'm concerned ••• We are trying to teach school children the 
law of the land and we will abide by it ••• Vi;rginia has always taken care 
of her problems and I think still has the ability. 119 One reason be-
hind the mild response was the delay of implementation of desegre-
gation. Virginia's Governor Stanley reflected: "Now it. ap.Pears assured 
the decision of the Supreme Court will not caff.ect. the public schools 
during the term. opening nm ... -t fall, we shall have time to give full 
a,nd careful consideration to means arriving at an acceptable solution. 1110 
(underlin~ng author). Southern States, including Virginia, saw a 
means of at least delaying compliance indcfinately, if not stopping 
it. J.J. Brewbaker, r!orfolk's Superintendent of schools statement on 
Brown embodies. the attitudes of most of Virginia, "· •• We should accept 
-
3 
the decision calmly and not let our emotions get.·.in':the way· •of plan-
ning for the de\rclopments ahead. It must be done intellectually rather 
than emotionally ••• \le feel that it will be 1960 before the ruling will 
become fully effective. This is a favorable factor. Gradual changes 
nre of course hotter thun sudden ones ••• 'l'he :;uprcmc Court intended i \; 
11 to be that way. 11 
Of.course, not all Southern leadern responded as calmly as those 
in Virginia. Some officials vfolentl:y opposed the idea of segre-
gation, such as Governor Talmadge of Georgia: " ••• 'there will never 
be mixed schools \·;hile I am Governor' and warned that school into-
12 gration would lead to "bloodshed.' " The stage was set far the 
confrontation of the past (racial segregation) with the doctrine , 
racial integration. 
The second Brown case deciding on the method of implementation 
was released in 1955· In essence, the opinion gave Southern states a 
"reasonable" amount of time to begin integration of public schools; 
11 
••• the (district) courts will require that the defendents make a 
pronpt and reasonable start toward full cor.1pliance with our May 17, 
1954 ruling. 1113 But, tbe court qualified its statement with "once 
such a start (toward integration) has been made, the courts may find 
that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an 
. 111 
effective iw.nner. 11 . _ The Southern legislators seized the second 
Br01-m decid on~ as a chance to legally stall integration. 
In the hluck perspective, the first Brown opinion was a great 
one, but the second vras a great mistake. Blacks felt that the notion 
of deferring the exercise of a con::.ti tuti.onal right \'las a by-product 
4 
of the earlier attempts by Southern states to hold fost to segregation 
in graduate and professional schools until they had time to construct 
separate-but-equnl focilities. 15 Negroes had already won the battle 
for integration of: graduate nnd professional schools, and Hith the 
first Brmm case had won the battle for integration of public 
schools. i\ftcr the second Brown decision, blacks found they h~d 
won the ba~ but had just begun to ficht the wnr n8ainst massive 
resistance. 
On August 30, i95Lf, Governor Stanle;{ Hp:pointed \·1hat was to be-
come lmm,'11 as the Gray Cor.:mission (nc:.med after the chnirman, Garland 
Gray), to stud;:r possible courses of action after the Bro1m ruling. 
During the Commission's fourtecn-monu~ r1pliberntion, public sen ti-
ments ai:;ainst integration began to harden, due mostly to an organiz-
ation l:noun as the Defenders of State SovereiBnty and Individual 
Liberties. The Defenders were a major force in mobilizing pro-
segregationist support by sponsoring rallies and providing speakers 
for public meetings.16 Due to the Defender's activities, the issue 
was kept before Virginians, gaining more and more support for a 
hard line stand agninst integration. 
The Gray Commission revealed a three-point plan dealing with 
segregation on November 12, 1955. First, the program would empower 
local school boards to assign pupils to schools for various reasons 
excent race. The boards would be able to avert, minimize or even 
})OSsibly allou se,sregation \·rith its placement decisions. Secondly, 
the stnte \·mulcl provide tuition grants from public funds for private 
schooling ,.fi.1crc public schools heel closed rnther than be integrated, 
5 
or if parents chose not to send children to integrated schools. 
Lastly, the legislature would nmend attendence lm·rs so that no child 
would be compelled to attend integrated schools. 17 
On November 7, 1955, the Sup.rcmc Court of /tppcals of Virginia, on 
the basis of section 141 of the Virginit'I constitution declared un-
constitutional tuition grants using public funds for war orphans in 
18 Almond '{. Day. ~['here fore, the constitution ha cl to be amended before 
the Gray plnn co1Lld be put into effect. The General Assembly favored 
the Grny plan n.nu quickly voted to hold a state-wide referendum on 
January 9, 1956 to decide if a constitutional convention should be 
held. 
While the General fl.sseinbly dealt with the Gray plan, James J. 
Kilpatrick, the editor of the Richmond News Leader launched an 
amazingly successful editorial campaign \·rhich ultimately undermined 
the conciliatory stance of the commission. He popularized the use 
of "interposition and nullification" to combat the Supreme Court 
using the Virginia and Kentucky·resolutions plus the writings of 
Spencer Roe.ne and Calhoun as a basis for his argurnents. 19 The 
interpositionists claimed the Supreme Court in the BrOi·m opinion 
amended the constitution, n power ,.,hi ch rests with the legislature 
or three-fourths of the states. Since the fiupreme Court could not 
amend the constitution, the Court's own action wo.s unconstitutional. 
. . 20 Therefore the Bro'l'm decision was invalJ.d. Kilpatrick went as far 
as to suggest the Assembly adopt a proposal for interposition and 
nullification 311d actnally the resolu~ion itself in an editorial. 
Host ,people knew interposition and nullification in the past, and 
6 
did not seriously think it would work, but saw it as more of a protest 
to tre Federal Government and the Suprer.1e Court. State Senator Armistid 
L. Boothe dismissed interposition as a defensive weapon, :paying 11 'that 
interesting theory' had been disppsed of by the great Chief Justice 
(Narshall) in HcCulloch v. I·!nryland. 1121Dcspite the wealrness of the 
doctrine, the General Assembly adopted a limited form of interposition 
on Februrary 1, 1956. 'l1he interest interposition caused was a sign 
Virginia wasn't ready to comply uith the Federal government on inte-
gration and was still trying.to find ways to fight it that went be-
yond the Grny plan. 
If interposition was a hint at the course Virginia would take 
against desecration, the referendum vote and conclusions drawn from it 
was a sure sign of an oncoming fight with the Federal government. In 
a heavy turnout for a cold .January day, the mvrgin was two-to .... one in 
favor of the constitutional convention. Virginia's Attorney General 
I,indsay Almond \·ms "highly elated," saying the decision was "the 
necer;sary first step toward a solution of the tragic dilemma in which 
we find ourselves ••• 1122 (underlining author's). The Byrd forces,which 
in essence ran politics in Virginia, hailed the outcome of the refer-
end.um as a mandate for total resistance, and by early 1956 had begun 
to· ·move beyond the Gray plan proposals to a hard line of protest. 23 
Norfoll:'s vote in the referendum (l~,519 for and l0,36o against), 
reflected the voters' were not as sure of resistance <"S the rest of 
the state. Before the referendum the Hiclunond Times-Dispatch' s 
7 
George H. Kelley reported on the chances of it in the second Congressional 
district, stating: 
" The voters and the campaigners are talking one thing, 
the effect of the Gray Commission's proposals on public 
schools. The city (Norfolk) votes which dominate the dis-
trict \rill be i:;on or lost on this fnctor. 
The initial impact of the Gray commission's tuition 
grant plan was that th .... schools, as the city now knows 
them, might be hurt. The proconvcntion forces hnvo had to 
make an uphill fight to dispell this f ecling. They say the 
task is not hopeless; thcy;rc not co11ccdinr; the district to 
thee' anti-convention camp. 11'- 1 
Virginia \"vas gearing up to battle segregation and its largest city 
was Havering. 
After the reforendun vote, Virginia was noodod with ideas to 
check integration altogether. Through the spring and summer of 1956 
the South fought for control over its puhlic schools. The struggle 
had turned from segregntion itself to a crusade for state liberty. On 
August 27, 1956, Governor Stanley called a special session of the 
General Assembly, and for a month, lesislators debated how best to 
25 counter the .Supreme Court decree~ The resolutions arising from the 
session became knm-m as the Hassi ve Resistance laws. The General 
Assembly provided a Pupil Placement Board, n statewide agency with 
pov:er to assign students to various schools and handle requests for 
trrn1sfcr. 'l'he uccnc:r's t.1ctionc would keep thine::; ns they were, or 
at least narrm·.' the scope of Brovm. Once a school received its final 
order to integrate, the Governor uas required to seize and close the 
school until it could be opened on a segr.ega-bed basis. If a school 
could not be ~c-opencd, the locality could open the school integrated 
without state control. Also, tuition grnnts from public funds for 
private schooling could be ha.d by pupil,s where the public schools had 
8 
26 been closed by the Governor. '111e laws were designed to fie;ht off 
integration and all Virginia needed Has n leader to put them into 
effect: Virginia found its leader i11 the 1957 CTubenatorial election 
in Lindsay Almond, tl10 1'1-'n who become the force behind massive re-
sistance. 
The guvernatorial election of 1957 was a symbolic selection 
between.total massive resistance and a more moderate stand for local 
options and open schools. Theodore Roosevelt (Ted) Dalton was a 
powerful republican of high moral standard who fought hard in a 
relatively close battle in 195~ against Byrd-machine candidate 
Thomas Stanley. He was the strongest throat to organizational 
proteges in thirty years. On the other side of the coin, J. Lindsay 
Almond was the Attorney General and had been Prince Edward County's 
lawyer before the Supreme Court. Almond was a highly emotional 
orator with the ability to reach the common man. In 1957, the two 
men squared off to battle for Vireinia's highest office. 
Ted Dalton's position on the biggest isGue in the election 
(integration) was one of moderation. He thought Virginia's best 
hope was in a local pupil placement board, similar to those insti-
tuted in Horth Carolina. Seeing that integration was held to a 
minimum, he felt Virginia would have a more defensible position in 
court with token integration. 27 Dalton's main stumbling block was the 
trouble in Little Rock, Arkansas. Virginians were afraid that Pres-
ident Eisenhower would send troops into V:irginia to enforce any court 
ordcrer1 inteeration. The republican Dalton found it hard to defend 
9 
himself ngninst criticism of the rcpublicnn administration stating, 
"the democratic opposition was trying ·to hold me hostage for the 
I,i ttle. Rock school troubles, for the Supreme Court desegregation :.de-
cision and for the Civil Hights 1egislntion before Coni:;ress ••• "28 
The democratic opponent, J. Lindsay f\lmon<l, wns a hard-line 
segregationist, campaigning with ferocity against the NAACP, the 
. 29 Supreme .Court, and the federal government. - J\.lmond stressed the 
Little Rock incident and promised the same for Virginia if Dalton was 
elected. Almond demanded massive resistance, but a '.'flexible positiontt 
to meet each and every crisis as it arose, and "apply the best brnins 
in Virginia"to devise new ,wq.ys ·to sta'Ve ·off integration.3° 
At election time, massive resistance was at a peak and ~dsay 
Almond was given sixty-three per cent of the popular vote. Almond 
saw his victory as a mandate for total massive resistance and called 
upon the General Assembly in his inaugural address "to stand firm 
with tmfailing unity of purpose and high resolve against eyery assault. 
upon the sovereignty of this commonwcalth. 1131 Hith massive resistance 
laws and a leader, Vir55.nia was ready to battle federal power for 
segregated public schools. 
During the sprint; and summer of 1958, five desegregation suits: 
slowly went through the courts and were coming close to the final 
order to integrate. Prince I~dward County, Warren County, Charlottes-
ville, Arlington and Norfolk city seemed likely to receive orders to 
inteerate by Septmember. Yet in spite of all the agitation, relatively 
few Virginians in the summer of 1958 grasped the fact that massive 
resistance would actually boil do\'m to locking the doors of the public 
10 
schools. 32 Little did Virginia know the confrontation was just 
around the corner. 
The confrontation between federal and state supremacy came to a 
city different from most in the south. Although the population was 
predominately southern, r.mny diverse elements from all over the 
United States, and even the world resided in Norfolk. The city was 
blessed with a great natural harbor, the port of Hampton Roads, and 
it drew four naval bases and the NATO command center to the area.33 
Norfolk's rncial bci.lance was twenty-c;evcn per cent Negro to 
seventy per cent Hhite, a negro population large enough to provide 
leadership, but not so large as to be threatening. For the largest 
city in Virginia with a population of 330,000, the history of racial 
relations was relatively good. Although the Negro was limited to the 
lower to middle classes usually, Norfolk had more opportunities in 
non-discriminatory jobs such as governmental service than in most 
cities in the south. It is true that there were separate schools, 
beaches and bathrooms, but Norfolk tended to be more liberal in its 
attitudes because of the diversity of population. 3l~ Like most, 
Horfolkians thought the Brmm decision would never affect their 't{ay 
of life. Little did they know but massive resistance was to come to 
the city in the sultry August of 1958. 
August in Norfolk was no different than in any other year. School 
clothes i·1ere bein~ advertised, high school football teams had started 
practice :for fall 8.:\mes and the school bo.'.lrd Han preparing for ruiother 
term. I3ut the rumblings of massive resi1:;tancc were beginning to upset 
plans for the coming school year. In early August the Pupil Placement 
11 
Board (under the auspices of the Norfolk r;chool Board), was under 
fire by Negro attorneys. The lmeyers protested testing and interviewing 
procedures set up by the city because tl1cy applied to negroes only. 
The case was before the Fedcrnl district court under Judge Walter E. 
Hoffman \·Jho reviewed applications after the board to see if the Neero 
protests uere justified. 
Apparently'. Norfolkfo.ns didn't seriously think the schools would 
close in the 1958-59 term because private school enrollments had not 
surpassed the previous year, but the increased inquiries into private 
education did suc;ccst Norfolk ci tj zens were not completely blind to 
the possibilities ··of closed schools. 35 Preparations for private 
schooling uere being made by the Tidern:tter Educational l~oundation, Inc., 
but the organizstion could only accomodate between eight-hundred to 
!J,ine:;.liundred ·pupils of' ·the ten-thousand \·thlch \"Jould be displaced by 
school closings. Host in the city thought legalities would keep the 
cases tied- up in court for at least another year, and Iforf olk was 
unprepared for the possib~litJ: of cloaed schools. 
After a month-lone deliberation, the Pupil Placement Board de-
nicd one hmidred-ruid "ffft:y.,.,one n~gro applications Tor· i-1hite: schoolis 
on August 19, 1958. The reason for denial ranged from incomplete 
test procedures, hcnlth, ::>afety, trnnsportation nnd possible racial 
3'7 
strife involved. ' Under pressure from the district court, the Norfolk 
Placement Board :::-eluctantly assigned and enrolled seventeen Hegre 
children into \1hite schools. Although the Board believed the assign-
men ts were contrnry to \·rhat it thought wer:-: tho "l1or.:t :i rit:erests'' of 
the school children and general public, the Board felt it had no 
12 
choice in the matter.38 
Other matters complicated the case in Norfolk. Before the 
Supreme Court was a case orii;inatint:; from Little Rock, Ar1'..ansas, 
in which the Circuit Court of Appeals hacl granted a two-year delay 
of integration. Judge Hoffman stated he would allow a delay in 
implementation in the Supreme Court allowed Little Hock the two-
year period·. Norfolk school officials decided to delay school 
opcnines until the decision was made on the Little I~ock case. 
Norfolkians still hnd hope, but it was fading fast. 
The Supreme Court decided in Cooper v. A1'3ron (358 U.S. 1 
1958) on September 12, 1958, that the second Drmm decision's 
"integration with all deliberate speed" doctrine had been delayed 
long enough, and desegration was to be implemented irnmediately.39 
NorfoD'- officials sav the handwriting on the wnll and applied 
for an injunction so that the state placement board's denial of 
Hegro applications in their city would not be put into effect. 
On Septenber 22, th-e da.y schools were to open in Norfolk, only 
one j1mior high school (where no blacks had applied), and the 
segrec;cted elemento.ry schools opened. The rest of Norfolk's 
schools:wcre closed by order of Virginia state law. Massive 
resistance had come to Iforfolk and the city was S'tunned. 
Norfolk had one last ditch hope of delaying integration for 
one more year, by appealing to the United States Fourth District 
Court of Appeals to reverse Judge Hoffman's order. If the re-
I 
versal was granted, Norfolk would open the junior and scn.ior high 
cchools affected by the integration order on September 29. The 
13 
last hope for Norfolk schools died on September 23, when Judge 
Simon Sobeloff of the Court of Appeals refused to stay the order 
110 
to desegregate:. The schools were to stay closed, displacing 
ten-thousand students who hnd to seek an education elsewhere or 
forego school for an indefinite period. 
After the school closings, pupils h3d few options open for 
obtaining an education. Students could go outside the City and 
attend night clasnes, such as the ones offered in South Norfolk, 
or to private schools within the state and sometimes out of state. 
Some pupils went to live with relatives outside the Norfolk area 
to attend schools in other districts on a tuition basis. But 
few parents could afford to send their children away, so they formed 
"tutoring groups," asking teachers from the school system to head 
the sessions. Each student paid a fee to cover costs, usually 
around five dollars a week. As one teacher stated, tutoring groups 
were "not a substitute for public education--we hope it is just 
going to tide us over until something in done about public edu-
cation. 1141 Tutoring groups varied in size from twenty to four-
hundred and were held in private homes, storefronts, offices or 
churches. One church-sponsored group ha<l four-hundred pupils 
from the Horview area sign up and turned aw:i.y ~mother three-hundred 
for lack of space. Church officials were careful to point out 
that "the church is not recognizing mansive resistance but is 
only recognizing the distress and dispair of the parents and 
I 4 ') 
children." L ifost parents and children realized tutoring groups 
were a .stop-gap effort with almost no chance for state a.ccreditation, 
14 
but felt some educntion was better than none at all. 
The Tidewater Education Foundation headed by Jamen Hartin IV 
had been working on plnns for private schooling since early summer, 
1958. The day after the schools closed, registration for Martin's 
private schools increased dramatically. Student comments on regis-
- . tration day covered~the spectrum of attitucles prevalent in the city. 
One student, Ruth Akers, stated that she didn't "care one way or the 
other, just so I don't have to aGsocinte with them (Hcgroes). 11 On 
the other hand, Jimmy Bolten said "I just wish they would open the 
schools up. It seems like it (integr<ition) has got to come sooner 
or later. 1143 Martin uas to open up his academies as soon as he 
could negotiate with the Governor for relensing Norfolk's teachers 
from their contracts and felt he "wouldn't hnvc any trouble" securing 
1-1/1 
their services upon their release. 
Norfolk's school teachers surprised many by .refu::;ing to parti-
cipate in the privvte schools set up by the Tidewater Education 
Foundation. An outraged Hartin accused the terichers of treachery 
because the move deeply wounded the private rochool effort he had 
helped plm1. FN-iring that by suppr:irl: i.ng private schools, public 
education in Norfolk might cease to exist. On October 2, the Norfolk 
Education Association voted 487 to 89 in favor of a resolution 
demanding the city of Norfolk to reopen secondary schools on a 
seeregated basis if Governor Almond failed to restore them as a 
45 sesregated syGtem. The resolution read: "He as teacherr; are 
deeply concerned ab.out public schools and feel that no system of 
privnte schools or private tutoring groups can adequately replace 
15 
our public schools. Hence we urge the immediate opening of the 
closed schools so our children will not be penalized ••• 1146 
Later in October, the N.E.A. voted to discontinue teaching 
in tutoring groups by January 1 if the schools weren't opened. 
Acting as a unified body, the teachers forced parents and civic 
leaders to deal directly with the problem and not become complacent 
because the children were receiving an education without schools. 
Teachers were not the only people protesting the school sit-
uation:. Hinistries became a moving force for open schools. Sixty 
Pastors of diffcrint; denomin[ltions petitioned the city: council 
to open schools immediately. Parents and the students themselves 
flodded council and Governor Almond with petitions also. The Haury 
High School Student Cooperative Association's petition best stated 
the reasons for opening the schools: 
"No system of private education can ever take the 
place of our school system for the following reasons: 
1) The majority of families cannot afford·private schools 
or tutoring classes. 
2) The facilities are inadequate. 
3) Proper supervision cannot be maintained. 
4) The oppo~7unities for college entrance are drastically 
reduced. 
Even a member of the Norfolk School Board, Benjamin J. Willis, 
added his voice to the mounting protests. On October 4, 1958, Mr. 
Willis said he would rather have schools open with n minimum amount 
of integration than see children denied an education. Among his 
reasons for publically annmmcing his belief was the reactions of 
16 
the children, the innocent victims of massive resistance: 11 I 
have had any number of children come to me with tears in their 
e;y-es ••• They all ask 'Isn't there something you can do, Mr. Willis?' 
It brenks your heart to see a chilu plcnd for an cducation. 1148 
The Norfolk City Council took the brunt of the protests. By 
September 30, Mayor Fred Duckworth and the Council were debating 
the "pros and cons" of a referendum to learn the true f~eling of 
the populous on the school crisis. In late October, the council 
decided to hold the referendum two weeks after the Senatorial election. 
The referendum would ask if the council should petition the Governor 
for the return of the public schools, but added at the bottom of the 
ballot that there could be a tax increase to run the schools since 
the state would automatically cut off funds to an integrated system. 49 
The Norfolk Commitee for Public.Schools, an organization dedicated 
to open public schooling integrated or not, protested the addition 
to the ballot referring to taxes because the wording was "loaded." 
rrhe Cammi tee twice tried to get nn injunction stopping the refer-
endum and faileu. 50 
The City Council watched hro importcnt elections in November, 
the Senatorial rnce and the referendum. On Hovember 4, 1958, 
Senator Byrd rU1Uling on a platform endorsing masaive resistance 
won re-election in the stntc seventy per cent and took ;:i, large 
majority of the vote in Norfolk. Two weeks later, the vote was 
three-to-two against petitioning ,the Governor for return of the 
schools in the IJorfolk referendum. The council felt the results 
of the two elections was a mandate for further resistance, and 
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Mayor Duckworth caid "the people have spoken. We'll do the best 
"th th · t" ,,sl we can wi e situa ion ••• ~ Some observers thought the vote 
misleading because only 21,052 out of a population of 330,000 
decided the fate of the schools. Jn spite of the small munber of 
voters, Norfolk City Council was resolved to toke an even harder 
stand against integration. By late November, the douncil had 
voted tQ take direct control of the school budget and appropriate 
the money to operate schools on a month-to-month basis. In essence, 
the council lw.d the power to withola ftmding to the Black schools 
still functioning, thereby closing them also. Most people dis;,. 
approved of the retaliatory move, even Governor Almond frowned 
52 
upon the council's ''cut-off the funds", measure. 
Hhile protests were mounting, the Stnte and Federal Courts 
became once again the battleground of segregntion. In early Sep-
tember, the Governor instituted a friendly suit before the Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals to test the validity of publically funded 
tuition grants (Harrison v. Day). Attorney General Harrison peti-
tioncd the court for a Wl'it of mandamus, ordering Comptroller Sidney 
Day_to release funds for tuition grnnts. The judges would then 
rule on the constitutionality of the massive resistance lnws.53 
Governor Almond hoped the Vircinia Court \·:ould be lenient in its 
interpretation of the Virginia constitution nud allow the laws to 
stand. 
In late October, a group of Norfolk parents on behalf of their 
children nci.r:ied J. I,indsay Almond as a defendant in a class-action 
suit ained at re-opening the six closed schools claiming a violation 
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r:4 
of the fourteenth amendment (Jo.mes v. Almond) • .:.> The suit was 
unusual because it uas brought before the District Court by white 
parents whereas in other areas the challenr,cs had been started by 
the NAA.cP. In addition, two other cases to open the schools had 
been filed in the federal court,one by another group of white 
parents, and one by the NAACP. Areument~tion for Ha.E_rison v. 
Day and_James v. Almond wns set for mid-Hovcmber in both the federnl 
and state courts. December would be a month of waiting for the 
opinions of the courts and the conclusion of the crisis. 
January 1959 turned out to be n decisive month for school 
desegregation iii' Norf'olk arrl:r the: state_··or· Virginia •.. Harrison. v. 
Day and James v. Almond were before the courts nnd opinions would 
be rendered around mid-month. Two important influences on Norfolk, 
the navy and prominant businessmen broke i:heir neutrality on the 
segreeation issue nnd spoke out for open schools on an indirect 
manner. L"1. a press conference, President Eisenhower told the . 
nation be thinking of opening schools on the naval bases of Norfolk, 
1;1eaning the possible loss of federal impace funds which went to 
school construction due to the influx of "nnval" children.55 
Rumors were rampant after the ~·resident's announcement and some went 
as far as to predict the shut down of navul bases , which would 
be a severe blow to the economy in Norfolk • 
.i\.rea businessmen were nlso worried aboui: the effect of closed 
schools on the economy. M. W. Armistid III, president of the 
Roanoke Times-World Corp. summed up the feelings of individual 
businessmen in Virginia and especially Norfolk 1·1hen he stated: 
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"No considerable plant is going to relocate in the Roanoke Valley 
or anywhere in Virginia if there are no adequate mass educational 
facilities. Those who say otherwise either arc mistaken or they 
are burying their heads in the sand. 1156 
On January 16, 1959, cii:;hty-1rinc Norfolk residents filed 
suit in the district court to block the city council's "cut-off 
the funds" plan. 'l'hc council 1ms charged with engaging in a evasive 
scheme 'Jto nullify fedcrnl cou.t't orders" by voting to cut off funds 
for education above the sixth crade after Februrary l. 57 Judge 
Hoffman scheduled the case for January ~G. 
'Massive Resist<mce laws were struck doi;m 'by both the federal 
and state courts on January 19, 1959. The Virginia Supreme Court 
of Appeals held the state was required to maintain free public 
education and closing the schools was a violation of the Virginia 
constitution. Later in the day, a three-judge federal court ruled 
the massive resistance laws unconstitutional, leaving only one ,~, 
obstacle to open schools, the Norfolk City Council. 
One day befbre Judge Hoffman ruled on Council's fund cut-off 
plan, one hundred prominant businessmen of Norfolk took out an ad 
in the two city newspapers, in essence appealine to the city council 
to "do all within its power to open the schools" because it had 
become appurent thnt segregated schools could no loneer be maintained.59 
The protest by the businessmen "broke the camel's back." Massive 
r.esist::mce was a dying issue in Virginia and Judge Hoffman's order 
at the end of the month to turn funding back over to the direct 
control of the school board laid to rest the last obstacle in the 
20 
l:1ay of desegregated -schools •. Norfolk schools operied segregated ·in 
a peaceful ~anner on Februrary 2, 1959· 
Segregation itself was not dead in Virginia, but it took on 
a more· subtle approach. Governor Almond appointed a commission 
on the same dny the schoolc opcw~d in Norfolk to deal with the 
problem in a different way. The commission brought forth the 
Perrow or "frccdon o:f.' choice"::Plan, letting parents decide if their 
children would attend an integrated school. No, segregation was 
not dead, it had just gone into hiding. When and if segregation 
ends altogether, whether it be ''dejure" (by law) or "de facto (by 
the fact), the transition from past attitudes of racial superiority 
to a "colorless" society will be complete. 
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